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Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon
Disenfranchisement Constitutes Vote Denial
Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act
MATTHEw E. FEINBERG, EsQ.*
Giving prisoners the vote is a question of moral conscience
not political conscience. . . . If prisoners are excluded from
voting, then we don't have a democratic society - we are
just playing lip service to one. The government must accept
that prisoners remain citizens of this country with legitimate
human rights, including the right to vote.'
Introduction
Today, approximately 3.9 million adult United States citizens -
roughly two percent of the national population eligible to vote - are
barred from voting booths every election.2 In today's polarized
political society, the vote of two percent of the people can swing a
single representative election from one candidate, or one party, to
another, or a voter referendum from "for" to "against." Most
notably, that same two percent could swing control of the White
House, the Senate, or the House of Representatives into one party's
corner. There can be no more telling example of this than the 2000
Presidential election of former President George W. Bush and former
* LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., University of Baltimore School of
Law; B.S. Ed., University of Virginia. Mr. Feinberg is an attorney in private practice in
Washington, D.C.
1. THE SENTENCING PROJECT - DISENFRANCHISEMENT NEWS, http://www.sentencing
project.org/detaillnews.cfm?news id=874&id=133 (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
2. George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy & Politics, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 872 (2005) (citing Michael J. Gottlieb, One Person, No Vote: The Laws
of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1939, 1940 (2002); Brian Pinaire, et al., Barred
from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003)).
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Vice-President Al Gore, where control of the White House was
determined by less than 600 votes in the state of Florida.3 Although
the right to vote has always been considered one of the most
fundamental rights of the citizens of this country,4 and in modem
society, it has been considered inherent to almost every citizen,s
during every period of this nation's history, convicted criminals, in
one form or another, have always been excluded from the election
franchise. 6
Early American voting rules disenfranchised more than just
convicted felons; over time, however, voting restrictions against
African Americans, Native Americans, women, those without
property, and the mentally ill, fell by the wayside.7 The Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments
abolished voting restrictions based on race, sex, financial means, and
age, respectively.8 In truth, the only major restriction on voting
rights that survives today is the disenfranchisement of criminal
offenders. 9
Almost every state now disenfranchises felons in some way -
only Maine and Vermont do not. 10 Three states permanently bar
felons from the voting booths, ten disenfranchise felons temporarily,
and thirty-six automatically reinstate a felon's right to vote upon that
individual's completion of his or her prison sentence, parole or
probation period."l Based on these facts, it is clear that the rescission
of felons' right to vote has some impact on every election, during
every election cycle, nationwide. Most notably, the presidential
election of 2000 stirred the felon disenfranchisement debate.12 High
minority crime rates have led to racially disproportionate ratios of
3. R. Gregory Jerald, Modern Day Discrimination or a Valid Exercise of States' Rights?:
The Circuits Split as to Whether the Federal Voting Rights Act Applies to State Felon
Disenfranchisement Statutes, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 141, 145 (2005).
4. James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters - A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435, 437
(2010) (citing Common Clause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009)).
5. Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Contested
Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 578 (2010) (citing Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
6. Brooks, supra note 2, at 852-53 (citations omitted).
7. Id. (citing Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 160 (2001)).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV,
§ 1, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
9. Alec C. Ewald, 'Civil Death': The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045.
10. Brooks, supra note 2, at 872.
11. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States I
(Mar. 10, 2010), at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd-bs-fdlawsinusMarl 1.pdf.
12. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights
Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 690 (2006).
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disenfranchised felons. 13  Approximately 1.4 million black
Americans, or thirteen percent of black men, are disenfranchised
from voting.14 With such a large percentage of potential minority
voters banned from registering their opinions in elections, and the
fact that a large percentage of minority voters support Democratic
candidates in local and national elections,15 the effect of felon
disenfranchisement on the elective process is staggering.16 From
many people's perspective, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons gave [Florida] and [the] election to
George W. Bush and changed the course of American and world
history."17
Although the practice of disenfranchising felons was widely
accepted until shortly after the 2000 election, it has been challenged
frequently in the last ten years, 8 with multiple lawsuits filed to
overturn state felon disenfranchisement laws.19 This article addresses
the controversy through the most recent trend in felon
disenfranchisement litigation: challenging felony voter
disqualifications through the Voting Rights Act of 1965.20
In the next section, this article examines the historical practice
of felon disenfranchisement, tracing the practice from inception to
today.21 Part III reviews the legal landscape of felon
disenfranchisement, including the major constitutional and statutory
considerations. The Fourteenth Amendment specifically addresses
felon disenfranchisement; 22 and the Voting Rights Act contains a
nondiscrimination provision that has surfaced as a recent ground for
13. Brooks, supra note 2, at 873.
14. Id.
15. Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Causation or Correlation?: The Impact of LULAC v. Clements
on Section 2 Lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit, 107 MICH. L. REV. 675, 694 (2009) (citing League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 877, 891-93 (5th Cir. 1993) (en
banc)).
16. Cormac Behan & Ian O'Donnell, Prisoners, Politics and the Polls, 48 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 319, 322 (2008) (citing C. Uggen, J. Manza, and M. Thompson, Citizenship,
Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, in 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. SCI. 281-310 (2006).
17. Id.
18. Caroline A. Newman, Note, Constitutional Problems with Challenging State Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 38 CONN. L. REV. 525, 527-29
(2006) (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Galvin, 575
F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor,
405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982).
21. See infra Part 1.
22. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. For a discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies
to felon disenfranchisement, see infra Part III.A.
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challenging the disenfranchisement of felons in the court system.23
The article considers the relevant case law from various federal
appellate courts, including Richardson v. RamireZ24 and Hunter v.
Underwoo2s - the two Supreme Court decisions that address felon
disenfranchisement. Next, the focus shifts to two United States
Court of Appeals decisions: Johnson v. Governor26 and Hayden v.
Pataki,27 both of which hold that the nondiscrimination provisions of
the Voting Rights Act do not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.
Part II concludes by addressing Farrakhan v. Washington28 and
Farrakhan v. Gregoire,29 which applied two different types of
analysis to the issue.30
Because the potential Circuit split makes the question ripe for
Supreme Court review, Part III asks whether Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act invalidates felon disenfranchisement provisions as
racially discriminatory. In answering the question, this article
analyzes the Voting Rights Act and suggests that because the plain
meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Voting Rights
Act is applicable to felon disenfranchisement.
Turning to the text of the statute itself, this article will
demonstrate that felon disenfranchisement results in the denial of the
right of citizens to vote on account of race. Because the Supreme
Court has never considered or developed a test for vote denial claims
under the Voting Rights Act, this article proposes a test based on the
Court's treatment of vote dilution claims. Under this new test and its
three principle concepts of power, cohesion, and submergence, this
article argues for an end to felon disenfranchisement because it
23.42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act as it
applies to felon disenfranchisement, see infra Part III.A.
24. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Richardson v. Ramirez is discussed infra at
Part H.A.
25. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
26. Johnson v. Governor, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005). Johnson v. Governor is discussed
infra at Part II.C.I.
27. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006). Hayden v. Pataki is discussed infra at
Part II.C.2.
28. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Farrakhan 1]
Farrakhan I is discussed infra at Part II.C.3.a.
29. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Farrakhan II]
Farrakhan II is discussed infra at Part II.C.3.b.
30. The Circuit split created by the Farrakhan cases has been complicated by a recent en
banc, per curiam holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October
7, 2010, the court modified its prior decisions to require plaintiffs seeking to overturn felon
disenfranchisement laws due to racial disparity in the criminal justice system to prove intentional
discrimination either in the enacting of the felon disenfranchisement provision or in the criminal
justice system as a whole. Despite this ruling, the court did not modify its decision that Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon disenfranchisement. See generally Farrakhan v.
Washington, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir, 2010) [hereinafter Farrakhan III].
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results in racial discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
I. Historical Background
Consistently throughout history, Western civilizations excluded
convicted criminals from voting in representative elections.31
Ancient Greek and Roman cultures barred felons from voting in what
are generally considered the first instances of the practice.32 In
Greece, criminals were placed in "infamy," a type of punishment
which prevented them from voting, attending assemblies, making
public speeches, or holding political office. 33 A similar penalty was
imposed in ancient Rome for crimes involving "moral turpitude."34
In Medieval and Renaissance Europe, "civil death" and "attainder"
laws required criminals to forfeit family and political rights.35 In
nineteenth century Europe, felons were not allowed to vote or to
hold public office.36  The United States inherited its
disenfranchisement laws from the English.37 Eleven of the thirteen
original colonies adopted felon disenfranchisement provisions in
their individual constitutions before 1821.38 By the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, twenty-nine states
disenfranchised felons.39
Criminal voting restrictions originated from a desire to prevent
those individuals who have shown a history of poor decision-making
from electing the officials who govern the community. 40 These laws
have continued over time, based on the presumption that criminal
offenders should not participate actively in the administration of a
society, by the rules of which he or she refuses to abide.41 As one
31. Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values: Liberalizing
Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 283, 331 (2007) (citing Alec C. Ewald, 'Civil Death': The Ideological Paradox of
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1059-66
(2002)).
32. Ewald, supra note 8, at 1045.
33. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316 (quoting Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of
Conviction and their Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SC. 347, 351 (1968)).
34. Id. (citing Damaska, supra note 33, at 351).
35. Id. See also Robin L. Nunn, Comment, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 763, 765 (2005).
36. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316 (citing Damaska, supra note 33, at 352-53). See also Nunn,
supra note 35, at 765.
37. Nunn, supra note 35, at 765.
38. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316-17 (quoting Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2nd
Cir. 1967) (citations omitted)).
39. Id.
40. Nunn, supra note 35, at 766.
41. Clegg, supra note 7, at 172.
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author put it: "[W]e do not want people voting who are not
trustworthy and loyal to our republic.... It is not unreasonable to
suppose that those who have committed serious crimes may lack this
trustworthiness and loyalty."42 Courts which have examined the
issue have gone a step further: Law-abiding citizens may prohibit
criminal offenders from electing the legislators, executives,
prosecutors and judges who draft and enforce the laws of the
community.43 While this reasoning may seem logical, the automatic
disenfranchisement of felons leads to some questionable
circumstances. Even today such crimes as disorderly conduct,
breaking a water pipe, aiding or abetting another to gamble, and
aiding or encouraging animal fights, can cause a person to be
stripped of the right to vote.44
Still today, felon disenfranchisement remains the norm in the
United States. As a result of various re-enfranchisement campaigns,
however, many of the forty-eight states, plus the District of
Columbia, which currently disenfranchise felons have relaxed their
voting restrictions slightly.45 Public support for re-enfranchisement
has also increased: A 2002 study showed that the public supports re-
enfranchisement by wide percentages for felons, probationers,
parolees, and to an extent, even for violent offenders. 46 Combined
with the legislative trend of "softening" felon disenfranchisement,
these numbers show support for a restructuring of felon
disenfranchisement in this country.
As is often the case when public support for a position changes
over time and begins to contrast with the history of practice, various
lawsuits are filed to determine what is right. However, in the cases
that have arisen out of the conflict between public opinion and
historical practice, the real question is whether felons have a legal
framework with which to challenge their disenfranchisement.47
II. Relevant Law
The first challenges to state felon disenfranchisement statutes
were based on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
42. Id.
43. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 33 (quoting Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2nd Cir.
1967)).
44. Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1940 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1943.
46. Jeff Manza, et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 283 (2004).
47. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Farrakhan 11, 590 F.3d 989 (9th
Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd
Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor, 405 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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Fourteenth Amendment.48 Richardson v. Ramirez,49 citing language
in the Amendment regarding states' authority to deny criminals the
right to vote,50 iterated a tacit approval of felon disenfranchisement
laws in the United States.5' Hunter v. Underwood later held that the
Amendment's support of felon disenfranchisement was limited and
could not be used to purposefully discriminate against racial
minorities. 52 Following the ratification of the Voting Rights Act
which, in part, outlaws discriminatory voting restrictions, 53 felon
disenfranchisement was frequently challenged as an impermissible
voting restriction,54 but often the result was no different. In Johnson
v. Governor,s and Hayden v. Pataki56 federal courts held that felons
cannot attack disenfranchisement laws through Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act.5 7 In 2010, however, in a departure from what
was considered well-settled law on that subject, Farrakhan v.
Gregoire (Farrakhan 11)58 overturned the State of Washington's
felon disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act,59
creating, what was perceived at the time, as a circuit split. While the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would later state
that its opinion in Farrakhan 11 "sweeps too broadly[,]" it still left
intact its finding that the Voting Rights Act applies to felon
disenfranchisement.60 The Supreme Court has yet to consider felon
48. See Richardson, 418 U.S. 24, and Hunter, 471 U.S. 222.
49. See Richardson, 418 U.S. 24.
50. The relevant text of the Amendment states that '[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned
among the . .. States according to their respective numbers, [b]ut when the right to vote at any
election . .. is denied to any of the. . . inhabitants of such State, . . . or [are] in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in ... proportion.' U.S. CONST. amend XIV §§ 1-2.
51.See generally Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24
(1st Cir. 2009); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Governor, 405 F.3d
1214 (11 th Cir. 2005) (each citing Richardson v. Ramirez for its holding that, without more, felon
disenfranchisement is not a violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection).
52. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982).
54. See Farrakhan H1, 590 F.3d 989; Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson,
405 F.3d 1214.
55. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
56. Hayden, 449 F.3d 305.
57. See generally Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
58. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010). Farrakhan II actually began as Farrakhan v.
Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), which first reached the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2003. The Court in Farrakhan I was actually the first decision of
a federal appellate court which took up the question to find that the Voting Rights Act applies to
felon disenfranchisement laws. The Court remanded the case back to the district court.
Eventually the case returned to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as
Farrakhan H.
59. See generally Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989.
60. Farrakhan III.
Summer 2011] 67
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
disenfranchisement under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, but
its decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,61 which outlines a test for racial
discrimination in vote dilution claims, may be instructive in creating
a framework by which to reach felon disenfranchisement.
A. Richardson v. Ramirez
In Richardson v. Ramirez, ex-felons challenged a California law
that denied people convicted of "infamous crimes" the right to vote.62
The representative plaintiffs alleged that the law, and various
election rules used to disenfranchise felons, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 They further
argued that the government must prove a compelling state interest
was served by the disenfranchisement of a class of potential voters,
and that California was unable to do so with respect to felons.6 4 The
United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the language of
the amendment affirmatively permitted the disenfranchisement of
felons, therefore no equal protection challenge could survive.65 In a
majority opinion, the court noted that, while a typical Fourteenth
Amendment challenge focuses on section one of that amendment,
felon disenfranchisement also calls for a Section Two analysis.66 The
state argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not be used to strike down felon
disenfranchisement when the text of the amendment explicitly
permits the practice. 67 After a thorough analysis of the legislative
history behind the amendment, the Court agreed with the state,
holding that Congress intended to disenfranchise felons at the time
the amendment was written.68 The Court also found that the state is
not required to show a compelling state interest as a basis for felon
disenfranchisement.69 Under the Court's analysis, Section One of the
amendment could not be used to bar a practice expressly permitted
by Section Two;70 therefore, felon disenfranchisement was, at least
on its face, constitutional. Equal Protection challenges to felon
disenfranchisement are not completely infertile ground, however, as
61. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,47 (1986).
62. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26-27.
63. Id. at 33.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 54-55.
66.Id. at 41-43. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contains both the equal
protection and due process clauses, while Section Two refers only to manner in which votes are
apportioned in representative elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
67. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
68. Id. at 43-53.
69. Id. at 54-55.
70. Id. at 55.
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revealed by the Court's decision in Hunter v. Underwood.71
B. Hunter v. Underwood
In 1901, the Alabama Constitution was amended to
disenfranchise from voting those convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude.72 In Hunter v. Underwood, plaintiffs filed suit
seeking a declaration that the constitutional provision was invalid as
to individuals convicted of crimes not punishable by a prison
sentence because the law was created on a racially discriminatory
basis and has had such an impact.73 The case became the first -
and, to date, only - time the Supreme Court ruled a felon
disenfranchisement provision unconstitutional, as the Court found
that an impermissible racially discriminatory purpose fueled the
amendment.74
The Court began its review by noting that Alabama's felon
disenfranchisement statute was race-neutral on its face.75 Under an
equal protection analysis, "official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact. . .. Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."7 6  For this case the Court applied a two-part test to
determine whether the Alabama felon disenfranchisement law
violated the Equal Protection Clause.77 First, a court determines
whether racial discrimination was "a substantial or motivating
factor" in the legislature's choice to disenfranchise felons.78 If so,
the burden then shifts to the state to prove that the provision "would
have been enacted in the absence of any racially discriminatory
motive.79
Under the two-part test, the Court noted the trial testimony of
various historians who stated that Alabama's Constitutional
Convention, in which the felon disenfranchisement provision was
enacted, was drafted with the intent to disenfranchise blacks.80 The
delegates at an all-white convention purposefully sought to establish
71. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id. at 224.
74. Id. at 232-33.
75. Id. at 227.
76. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-65 (1977)).
77. Id. at 228.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 228-31.
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white supremacy in the state. 81 The Court held that the rampant
racial animus behind the enactment of the amendment constituted the
racially discriminatory intent sufficient to render the provision
unconstitutional.82 The Court found this evidence so compelling that
it concluded that it was proof the provision would not have been
enacted absent the racially discriminatory motive.83 The Court's
ruling made it clear that the bar to reach an equal protection violation
in felon disenfranchisement cases is very high because of the
difficulty inherent in determining the motivation behind official
action.84 As a result, subsequent plaintiffs were forced to seek
additional, alternative avenues to attack felon disenfranchisement.
C. Voting Rights Act
Recent challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws have
focused on the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in
voter qualifications.85 The Voting Rights Act was originally enacted
in 1965 in an effort to outlaw racially discriminatory voting practices
in Southern states.86 The statute was amended in 1982 in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.87 Contrary
to Congress's original intent, Bolden required plaintiffs to satisfy an
exceedingly high burden to prove a discriminatory purpose.88
Congress responded by redrafting the statute to implement a results-
based test to determine whether a voting restriction is lawful. 89
Under the amended version, a statute violates the Voting Rights Act
if it "results in the denial of the right to vote on account of race." 90
Starting with the 2005 case Johnson v. Governor, the reduced burden
on potential plaintiffs in felon disenfranchisement cases produced an
increase in litigation challenging the practice in various states.91
1. Johnson v. Governor
81. Id. at 229.
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id. at 231.
84. Id. at 228 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
86.See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (discussing the purposes of
the Voting Rights Act as a measure intended to "banish the blight of racial discrimination in
voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.").
87. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
88. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 313 (citing City ofMobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62).
89. Id.
90. Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
91. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
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The plaintiffs, felons who had completed their prison sentences,
filed suit seeking to overturn Florida's felon disenfranchisement
statute under both the Equal Protection Clause and Section Two of
the Voting Rights Act.92 Using the Supreme Court directive in
Richardson v. Ramirez,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit found no equal protection violation on the
petitioners' Fourteenth Amendment claim because they concluded
that there was no indication in Florida's legislative history that racial
animus prompted the enactment of the disenfranchisement
provision.94
The plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act challenge proved to be a much
less clear-cut analysis for the court.95 Because Section Two only
applies to vote denial and vote dilution, it does not prohibit all voting
restrictions that may disproportionately affect minorities. 96 The court
had to decide whether the Voting Rights Act applied to felon
disenfranchisement at all.97 On this issue, the court determined that
Section Two does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws, stating
that such an argument placed the Voting Rights Act in conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 The court stated that Section Two
could only apply to felon disenfranchisement if there was a "clear
statement of Congress endorsing [that] understanding" and that
without "a record of constitutional violations, applying Section Two
of the Voting Rights Act to Florida's felon disenfranchisement law
would force us to address whether Congress exceeded its
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments." 99  In Johnson, the court found neither a clear
statement of Congress nor a history of constitutional violations in
92. In 2004, Florida law barred all citizens convicted of felonies from voting unless and until
authorities restored their civil rights through clemency. Johnson v. Governor, 405 F.3d 1214,
1216 (2005) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VI § 4 (1968)).
93. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24.
94. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1223-27.
95. Id. at 1227-34.
96. Id. at 1228.
97. Id. at 1227. At the time Johnson reached the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
various courts or judges had landed on opposite sides of the issue. In Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366
F. 3d 102, 124 (2nd Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that "Section 2 [of the
Voting Rights Act] did not reach New York's felon disenfranchisement statute[.]" A similar
analysis was reached by Judge Kozinski in his dissenting opinion in Farrakhan II, 359 F.3d 1116
(9th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, the majority in a prior review of Farrakhan found that
"Section 2 applied to Washington's felon disenfranchisement law[,]" see Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d
1009, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2003), and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit "assumed" that
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon disenfranchisement, see Wesley v. Collins,
791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th Cir. 1986).
98. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228-34.
99. Id. at 1229-31.
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2. Hayden v. Pataki
In Hayden v. Pataki, minority felons challenged New York's
felon disenfranchisement statute under the Voting Rights Act.101
Using a similar reasoning as the court in Johnson v. Governor,102 and
through an extensive statutory analysis, the court held that Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement.103
In conducting its analysis, the court first looked to the plain
meaning of the statutory text, noting that unambiguous statutes are
construed in accordance with their plain language. 04 Although the
statute is broadly worded, the court was unconvinced of its
ambiguity and noted that "there are persuasive reasons to believe that
Congress did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement
provisions within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act. . ."105
Using a totality of the circumstances test, 0 6 and the Fourteenth
Amendment's "explicit approval" of disenfranchisement, the court
held that absent intentional discrimination by the legislature, New
York's felon disenfranchisement statute would pass an Equal
Protection challenge.107 The court cited additional support for its
position from evidence of the widespread historical practice of
disenfranchisement in Western civilization and the states' near
unanimous disenfranchisement of at least some groups of felons.10s
The court also considered the congressional record of the Voting
Rights Act, including floor debates and subsequent legislative action
as additional persuasive authority on the issue.109  The court's
analysis was so comprehensive that other appellate courts adopted it
as a model for analyzing disenfranchisement statutes in their own
jurisdictions.110 Only one circuit disagreed with the Hayden
analysis.111
100. Id. at 1232.
101. Hayden, 449 F.3d 305, 310.
102. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214, 1233-34.
103. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 323.
104. Id. at 314-15.
105. Id. at 315.
106. Id. at 321.
107. Id. at 316 n.11.
108. Id. at 316.
109. Id. at 317-23.
110. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 31 (2009). In Simmons v. Galvin, the First Circuit
implemented an almost identical analysis and holding in finding the Massachusetts felon
disenfranchisement statute valid. Id.
111. See Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d 1009; Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 993.
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3. The Farrakhan Cases
In 1996, a group of Washington minority felons challenged the
state's felon disenfranchisement statute under Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act.112 In Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan 1),113
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state,
holding that any racial disparity in voting was not causally related to
felon disenfranchisement in Washington.114 The United States Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the district
court.115 On remand, the district court again granted summary
judgment in the state's favor on the ground that plaintiffs evidence,
although compelling, was insufficient to prove that felon
disenfranchisement denied felons the right to vote on account of
race.116 The plaintiffs appealed again, and the Court of Appeals held
that felon disenfranchisement practices in Washington violated
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.117
a. Farrakhan I
In 1996, Washington's felon disenfranchisement statute barred
from voting individuals convicted of crimes punishable by death or
incarceration.ls The plaintiffs' suit alleged violations of both the
United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, but it was the
plaintiffs' vote denial claim that shaped the district and appellate
courts' analyses.119 Unlike other circuits considering the issue, "[i]n
allowing Plaintiffs to proceed on their vote denial claim[,] the district
court rejected the State's argument that [the Voting Rights Act]
could not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws."120 This holding
allowed the court to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' factual
claims, but the court held that the facts were not sufficient to prove
that felon disenfranchisement caused racial disparity in
Washington's voting system.121
In defense of the statute, the state cited the historical acceptance
of felon disenfranchisement and argued that Washington had taken
112. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d 1009.
113. Id.
114. Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d at 1014.
115. Id.
116. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 995.
117. Id. at 1016.
118. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1012 n.1.
119. Id. at 1012-13.
120. Id. at 1012.
121. Id. at 1014.
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specific steps to eliminate racial disparities in its voting practices and
its criminal justice system.122  In contrast, the plaintiffs relied
primarily on statistical evidence and expert testimony showing racial
disparities in Washington's arrest, bail, pretrial release, charging, and
sentencing practices.123 In addition, the plaintiffs attempted to "show
the extent to which these disparities could be attributed to racial bias
and discrimination."124 Finally, the plaintiffs drew similarities
between the Washington disenfranchisement statute and those of
other states in which they alleged a discriminatory intent backed the
enactment of the law.125 The district court held that, despite its
compelling nature, the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to prove a
causal connection between the felon disenfranchisement statute and
the disproportionate impact on racial minorities' voting rights.126 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's threshold
decision that Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applies to any
voting qualification, including felon disenfranchisement. 127
However, the court reversed because the district court misapplied the
Voting Rights Act totality of the circumstances test, "which requires
the court to consider the way in which the disenfranchisement law
interacts with racial bias in Washington's criminal justice system to
deny minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the state's
political process."128 Integral to the court's analysis was the Senate
Report drafted alongside the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act, which set forth nine factors ("the Senate Factors") relevant to a
Section Two analysis, and particularly Senate Factor five.12 9 Senate




126. Id. at 1014.
127. Id. at 1016. At the time Farrakhan I reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, no other federal appellate court had considered whether the Voting Rights Act
applied to felon disenfranchisement laws; therefore the issue was one of first impression for the
court. See generally id.
128. Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d at 1014.
129. Id. at 1015 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 206-07). The nine factors cited in the Senate Report are: (1) the extent of any history of
official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2)
the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a
candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to
that process; (5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether political
campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; (7) the extent to which
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Factor five focused on "the extent to which members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process[.]"13o The court stated that Senate Factor five allows courts
to identify voting requirements that result in a shifting of racial
inequality from society at large into the political process. 131 The
court concluded that racial bias in the criminal justice system
hindered blacks' ability to participate in politics and elections, and
therefore was relevant to an analysis of the Senate Factors. 132 The
court remanded the case with instructions that the district court
consider the totality of the circumstances, "including the petitioners'
evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system,"133 as specified
in Senate Factor five.
b. Farrakhan II
On remand, the parties filed new cross-motions for summary
judgment.134 The petitioners relied generally on the same evidence
presented previously, but focused on two expert reports which
concluded that racial disparities in Washington's criminal justice
system could not be explained by legitimate or race neutral
factors.135 The experts also reported that "blacks and Latinos are
overrepresented, and whites underrepresented, among Seattle's drug
arrestees[,]" one cause of that being law enforcement officials' focus
on certain drugs and high-drug-use areas, when such focus is "not
explicable in race neutral terms."13 6
The district court had been compelled by the plaintiffs' evidence
to state that "there is discrimination in Washington's criminal justice
system on account of race . . . [which] clearly hinder[s] the ability of
racial minorities to participate effectively in the political
process . . .'137 After conducting an analysis for the other Senate
Factors, however, the court explained that the petitioners' evidence
members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; additional
factors include: (8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; (9) whether the policy
underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Id
130. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1015.
131. Id. at 1020.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 994.
135. Id. at 994-95.
136. Id. at 995.
137. Id.
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was only one factor of many to consider; that the other factors
weighed heavily in favor of the state; so that the totality of the
circumstances fell in the state's favor.138
The landscape of felon disenfranchisement law had changed
drastically by the time the case again reached the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Appellants argued that the sister-circuit decisions in
Johnsonl39 and Hayden'40 required the court to consider whether
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applied to felon
disenfranchisement. 141 The court had originally found that vote
denial claims challenging felon disenfranchisement laws were
cognizable under Section Two, and the court noted that its decision
in Farrakhan I was still the law of the circuit and found no need to
modify that ruling.142 Turning to the cross-motions for summary
138. Id.
139. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
140. Hayden, 449 F.3d 305.
141. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 999.
142. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 999 citing Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1016. The state's
argument required the litigation of a tangential question: whether an exception to the law of the
case doctrine, which states that "the decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be
followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case[,]" exists in Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d 989
(9th Cir. 2010), such that the Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), holding should be
abandoned and the State's argument upheld. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 999-1000. The law of the
case doctrine presently has only three exceptions. Id "A panel of [the] court has discretion to
depart from the law of the case ... where: '(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its
enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes
reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent
trial."' Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg 7 Planning Agency, 216
F.3d 764, 787 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997))).
The state requested that the court abandon its prior ruling under either or both of the first two
exceptions. Id. Citing Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 2005), and Hayden, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd
Cir. 2006), the state argued that "[tihe subsequent intervening authority of sister circuits reveals
that this Court's conclusion was clearly erroneous and works a manifest injustice." Farrakhan II,
590 F.3d at 999. The court, however, quickly dismissed that argument by stating that "[t]o the
extent Defendants suggest that these cases constitute 'intervening controlling authority' that
would make reconsideration appropriate, such argument is clearly incorrect. Id. at 999-1000.
Out-of-circuit cases are not binding and therefore do not constitute 'controlling authority."' Id. at
1000.
In further support of its decision, the court stated that it was not convinced that the Johnson and
Hayden cases, supra, show that Farrakhan I was clearly erroneous. Id. at 1000. The court noted
that both Johnson and Hayden "were rendered over vigorous dissents." Id. Moreover,
Farrakhan I "was called en banc but failed to attract a majority vote of the non-recused active
judges in favor of en bane rehearing." Id. Because the opportunity for further appellate review
was sought and subsequently denied, it cannot be said that the decision was clearly erroneous,
because the issue seemed well decided to the members of the bench at the time. The court also
pointed to an off-point sister circuit case for support: In Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-
62 (6th Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit treated "felon disenfranchisement
laws [as] cognizable under [Section Two of the Voting Rights Act]" despite not "directly
address[ing] the question." Id. The court thus recognized a "close split among the circuits" on
the issue, lending additional persuasive evidence that its decision in Farrakhan I was not clearly
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judgment, the court acknowledged that defendants rested their entire
appeal on the ground that "Plaintiffs' evidence of racial bias in
Washington's criminal justice system 'is very limited,' and is
inadequate to demonstrate that even Senate Factor 5 favors
Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law."143 On the other hand, the
plaintiffs pointed to the district court's fact-finding, which found
evidence of racial disparity in Washington's criminal justice system
to be compelling.144 The plaintiffs argued that they should not have
been required to produce evidence outside the scope of Senate Factor
5.145 Although the plaintiffs presented no evidence of the other
Senate Factors, the court held that "[s]ome Senate Factors may be
relevant as circumstantial evidence with respect to certain vote denial
claims, but proof of those Factors was not required where, under
Factor 5, Plaintiffs provided strong, indeed 'compelling,' direct
evidence of the alleged violation."146 The court also stated that
evidence drawn within one Senate Factor "may be enough in some
instances"147 to tip the totality of the circumstances in favor of the
petitioners.
The court then determined that the evidence offered by the
petitioners' proved that felon disenfranchisement vote denial in their
case was based on racial discrimination.148 As the Court stated in
Farrakhan I, "the 'on account of requirement may be met 'where
the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is
attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and
historical circumstances,' which include the state's criminal justice
system." 14 9  Citing to the lower court's fact-finding, the court
determined that plaintiffs had met their burden of proof, and were
entitled to summary judgment.150
c. Farrakhan III
The precedential nature of the Farrakhan cases would not last
erroneous. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1000.
143. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1002. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Court noted that
"Defendants' litigation strategy [was] a perilous one." Id. at 1003 (citing Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970)). Having offered no "countering evidentiary material nor . .. affidavit
[in support of its position]" the defendants left the Court only to decide whether the plaintiffs
"ma[de] out a prima facie case that would entitle them to judgment as a matter of law if
uncontroverted at trial." Id.




148. Id. at 1009.
149. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1009 (quoting Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d at 1019-20).
150. Id. at 1016.
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long. In October 2010, in a per curiam opinion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revisited its prior holdings on
felon disenfranchisement and added a wrinkle to the Voting Rights
Act analysis.15 In Farrakhan III, the court determined that the sister
circuit decisions in Johnson v. Governor,152 Hayden v. Pataki,153 and
Simmons v. Galvin,54 as well as the long history of acceptance of
felon disenfranchisement in this country, led the court to believe that
its prior decisions "sweep[ ] too broadly."155 Citing to Hunter v.
Underwoodl56 and McCleskey v. Kemp, 57 the court held that a
plaintiff seeking to have felon disenfranchisement outlawed under
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act based on racial disparity in the
criminal justice system must prove that "the criminal justice system
is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent."s58 Because,
in the Farrakhan cases, the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence
of intentional discrimination either in the criminal justice system or
in the felon disenfranchisement law, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the state.159
The decision in Farrakhan III is a curious one. While drafting a
new rule designed specifically for plaintiffs challenging felon
disenfranchisement on grounds that racial disparities exist in the
criminal justice system, the court did not overturn its prior decisions
on whether Section Two of the Voting Rights Act actually applied to
felon disenfranchisement at all.160 Accordingly, the circuit split on
that issue remains alive today. While the United States Supreme
Court has thus far declined to grant certiorari on the question of
whether Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon
disenfranchisement laws,161 the landscape of the issue today provides
compelling reasons for the nation's highest court to examine closely
the situation of convicted felons currently suffering without suffrage.
III. Analysis
151. Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d 990 (2010).
152. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234.
153. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 323.
154. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 41.
155. See generally, Farrakhan III at 992-93.
156.Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (outlawing felon disenfranchisement provisions specifically
enacted to intentionally discriminate against minorities).
157.McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1987) (requiring a showing of intentional
discrimination in the criminal justice system to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
158.Farrakhan 111, 623 F.3d at 993-94.
159. Id.
160. See generally, id.
161.See, e.g., Johnson v. Bush, 546 U. S. 1015 (2005) (the United States Supreme Court denied
the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari in the Johnson v. Governor case).
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Historically, the Fourteenth Amendment has proven to be an
almost insurmountable barrier for felons to surpass to invalidate
felon disenfranchisement provisions.162 Because of the unfavorable
language of the Amendment, which affirmatively permits the
practice of felon disenfranchisement, potential plaintiffs must prove
a discriminatory intent in the collective mind of the legislature in
order to show that disenfranchisement practices are
unconstitutional.163  Of course, in most cases, legislators do not
typically express their prejudices on the chamber floor, thus proving
discriminatory intent can be a difficult task for a plaintiff to
overcome. The Voting Rights Act, on the other hand, requires
plaintiffs to meet a more manageable burden: that the voting
restriction results in a discriminatory impact on a racial minority
group. Asserting a claim under the Voting Rights Act, however, is
also not without its barriers.
In order for a felon-plaintiff to mount a successful challenge to
disenfranchisement laws under section two of the Voting Rights Act,
he or she must meet two threshold requirements. First, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the applicable parameters of Section Two
allow for a challenge to felon disenfranchisement.164 As stated
previously, three circuits have determined that the tacit approval of
felon disenfranchisement in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
history of support for felon disenfranchisement in this country,
dictate that Section Two does not apply.16s One circuit has held the
opposite: that Section Two controls all voting restrictions, including
felon disenfranchisement.166 Thus, the Voting Rights Act could be
used to invalidate felon disenfranchisement statutes that result in the
denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race. 67 In
Part III.A., infra, this article argues that, based on a traditional
statutory analysis, as prescribed by the United States Supreme Court,
the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act dictates that Section Two
is applicable to all voting qualifications, including felon
disenfranchisement.168
Once a plaintiff has proven that Section Two applies to felon
disenfranchisement, he or she must show that the practice of
disenfranchising felons results in a denial or abridgement of the right
162. See infra Part II.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Farrakhan II; Simmons, F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d
1214.
165. See generally Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
166. See generally Farrakhan II.
167. Id.
168. See infra Part III.A.
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of an individual or group to vote on account of race or color.169
While the Supreme Court has created a test by which lower courts
are to analyze vote dilution claims under the Voting Rights Act,170 it
has provided no recent direction on vote denial claims, and it has
never considered vote denial under the Voting Rights Act. Because
the concepts of vote denial (as applied to felon disenfranchisement)
and vote dilution are inherently similar, in Part III.B, infra, this
article calls for a reasonable modification of the Court's vote dilution
test to be applied to vote denial cases.171 Under the modified test,
this article argues that felon disenfranchisement results in denying
citizens the right to vote on account of race.172
A. The Voting Rights Act Applies to Felon Disenfranchisement
In considering whether the Voting Rights Act applies to felon
disenfranchisement, it is necessary to engage in a statutory analysis
of the law being challenged.173 First, a court looks to the language of
the statute.174 If the text "has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case" then all inquiries stop.175
Only in exceptional circumstances should a court go beyond the
plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. 76 While some courts may
consider the legislative history of a particular statute, these courts do
so "with the recognition that only the most extraordinary showing of
contrary intentions from those data would justify a limitation on the
plain meaning of the statutory language." 7 Illustrative of this
concept is the Supreme Court's decision in BedRoc Ltd., LLC v.
United States, where Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined a majority
opinion in which the Court stated, in dicta, that to disregard the plain
meaning of a statute would be a "radical abandonment of
longstanding precedent[ ]."178
Based on this well-established Supreme Court precedent, any
analysis of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act must begin with a
determination of whether the textual language is unambiguous.179 If
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
170. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51; see also infra Section Ill.B.4.
171. See infra Part 111.1.2.
172. Id.
173.Hayden, 449 F.3d at 314-15.
174.Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
175.Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
176.Id (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
177.Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984).
178. Bedroc Limited LLC. v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8 (2004).
179. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450.
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so, the plain meaning of the law must be imposed, and only an
"extraordinary showing of contrary intentions" by Congress would
cause the Court to abandon that plain meaning. 80 The statutory text
of the Voting Rights Act has never been analyzed by the Court for
ambiguity. In the sections that follow, this article argues that Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act is unambiguous, and application of its
plain meaning dictates that it reaches all voting qualifications,
including felon disenfranchisement. 8 Although it has been argued
by various United States Courts of Appeal that the legislative history
of the statute indicates that Congress intended for felon
disenfranchisement to be excepted from review by Section Two,182
those arguments do not provide an "extraordinary showing" of
Congress's contrary intent.183 Therefore, the plain meaning rule must
not be abandoned and felon disenfranchisement must be analyzed
under Section Two.184
1. The Voting Rights Act Is Unambiguous
"The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined
by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole."185 Where it is reasonable to read a statute to have more than
one acceptable meaning, the statute will be considered to be
ambiguous.186 Therefore, if the language and context of Section Two
of the Voting Rights Act is susceptible to more than one reasonable
meaning, it will be considered ambiguous, and the statutory analysis
will require consideration of extrinsic factors.
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act outlaws voting
restrictions, the imposition of which result in the loss of voting rights
on account of one's race. 87 Various scholars and judges have opined
180. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75.
181. See infra Part III.A.
182. Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
183. Cf Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75 (1984).
184. See infra Part III.A.
185. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (citations omitted).
186.Condor Ins. v. Petroquest Resources, Inc., 601 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 2008)). See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 442 (1971) (stating that a statute was unambiguous because it was susceptible of
only one reasonable meaning); Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 99 (1904) (stating that a statute
is ambiguous where it is susceptible to two different meanings).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982). Section Two, specifically, states that "[n]o
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State ... in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. . ." Id.
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that the statute seems clear and unambiguous,188 but the Circuit
Courts of Appeal have struggled with the issue and have not
uniformly found such clarity.
2. The Perceived Circuit Split Was Predicated on Incorrect
Rulings from the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits
The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have
each considered whether Section Two of the Voting Rights Act is
ambiguous.189 The First and Eleventh Circuits found ambiguity in
the statute. 190 All three courts engaged in thorough extrinsic analyses
to arrive at the conclusion that Section Two was inapplicable to felon
disenfranchisement. 191 In Johnson v. Governor, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the statute's use of the terms "on account of race or color"
renders the statute unclear as to its application to Florida's felon
disenfranchisement law, the text of which is race neutral.192 In
Simmons v. Galvin, the First Circuit inexplicably stated that "it is
neither plain nor clear that plaintiffs' claim fits within the text of [the
statute]."193 In Hayden v. Pataki, the Second Circuit was unwilling
to state that Section two was ambiguous, but acknowledged that the
188. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the language
of Section Two is clear and unambiguous); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367-68 (2nd Cir.
2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is plain to anyone reading the Voting Rights
Act that it applies to all 'voting qualification[s].' And it is equally plain that [New York's statute]
disqualifies a group of people from voting."); Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy:
Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723,
774 (2006) (arguing that Section Two is clear and unambiguous); David Zetlin-Jones, Note,
Right to Remain Silent?: What the Voting Rights Act Can and Should Say About Felony
Disenfranchisement, 47 B.C. L. REV. 411, 439 n.227 (2006) (citing Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366
F.3d 102,128 n.22 (2004), to argue that Section Two is unambiguous).
189. Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
190. Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
191. Id
192. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.30. The court stated that Congress's decision to retain
the phrase "on account of race or color" makes it unclear as to whether Section [two] would apply
to Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision, which is endorsed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, applies to felons without regard to race or color (it is particularly telling that over
seventy percent of the plaintiffs' class is white), and is administered as one component of a
felon's criminal sentence. . . . Moreover, the deep division among eminent judicial minds on this
issue demonstrates that the text of Section [Two] is unclear. . . . Finally, the interpretation of the
statute advanced by the dissenters would suggest that currently incarcerated felons may also fall
within the scope of the statute. Unless one concedes that Section [Two] of the VRA reaches
currently incarcerated felons, the interpretation advanced by the dissenters provides an additional
reason why the statute is unclear. Id. (internal citations omitted).
193. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 35. Of course, the First Circuit's "agreement" with the Second
Circuit is actually a misinterpretation of the Second Circuit's decision, which does not state that
the statutory text is ambiguous. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315.
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text was broadly worded.194 It used this finding to justify abandoning
the plain meaning of the statute. 195 While the split amongst the
circuits on the potential ambiguity of Section Two might otherwise
indicate that the statute is, in fact, ambiguous, the decisions of each
of the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits are flawed and must be
discredited.
First, in Johnson v. Governor, the court held that Section Two
was ambiguous because the court believed: (a) it was unclear
whether the Florida statute is applicable to the Voting Rights Act; (b)
it was unclear whether the Voting Rights Act applies to felons
without regard to race or color; (c) judicial minds differ on the
issue;196 and (d) currently incarcerated felons may also be protected
under the statute.197 None of the reasons set forth by the Johnson
court are valid under Supreme Court precedent, as they do not assert
a reasonable alternative meaning to the text of the statute.198 Instead,
the court attempts to impugn ambiguity in the statute by stating that
different holdings could result from a legal analysis if the facts of the
underlying case are changed.199 The court's reasoning is flawed,
however, because it is not the end result of a legal analysis that
determines whether the statute is ambiguous, but it is the language of
the statute itself.200 Engaging in a legal analysis of even the most
unambiguous of statutes could result in different holdings; that is, in
fact, a fundamental aspect of litigation - that different sets of facts,
as applied to a single statute, control the end result.
Second, and as was stated previously, in Hayden v. Pataki, the
court never ruled that Section Two was ambiguous. 201 In fact,
although the court found the statute to be broad, it was unconvinced
of Section Two's ambiguity. 202 Thus, the court's analysis of the
history of felon disenfranchisement was impermissible under well-
194. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315. In fact, four of the nine judges on the Court of Appeals,
including current Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, noted that the statute was
unambiguous. Two others indicated that they were not convinced the statute was ambiguous, but
engaged in a historical analysis anyway.
195. Id.
196. The court's argument that because judicial minds disagree on whether the statute is
ambiguous, the statute must, in fact, be ambiguous, also must fail. In support of this assertion,
the court stated that Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2004), a similar felon
disenfranchisement case from the Circuit, ruled the statute ambiguous. On the contrary, that case
states that Section Two does not appear to be ambiguous, see Muntaqim at 128 n.22, and the
Johnson court fails to distinguish it, see generally Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
197. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 n.30.
198. See generally id. at 1229-30.
199. Id. at 1229-30.
200. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75.
201. See generally Hayden, 449 F.3d 305.
202. Id. at 315.
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settled Supreme Court precedent.203 Its decision should have been
confined to an analysis of the facts as they apply to the statute,
without considering extrinsic information.204 The court's
justification for stepping outside the plain statutory language is also
weak, given that it cites to Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States.205 Although Boston Sand & Gravel states that the plain
meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law,
and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it
exists[,]" 206 it is an eighty-two-year-old outlier case that has been
disregarded on countless occasions since. 207
Finally, in Simmons v. Galvin, the court cites to Hayden, supra,
to state that Section Two is ambiguous.208 This is a glaring flaw in
the court's analysis, given that Hayden did not actually stand for that
position. 209 In addition, through a results-based framework, the First
Circuit in Simmons concluded, just as the Eleventh Circuit did in
Johnson210, that Section Two is ambiguous. 211 In Simmons the court
stated that Section Two was ambiguous since it is unclear whether
Massachusetts's felon disenfranchisement statute is cognizable under
Section Two because it disenfranchises felons, not because of race,
but commission of a felony. 212 As this article argues in response to
the Johnson case, supra, the proper determination of whether a
statute is ambiguous turns on the language of the statute rather than
the result after facts are applied.
A common theme runs through each of the courts' analyses of
Section Two's potential ambiguity. In each case, the deciding court
questioned whether the state law under review may be considered
under Section Two.213 In each case, the courts claim that the
determination is unclear, which each court uses to find ambiguity in
the statute. 214 None of the courts provide a reasonable alternative
meaning of the statutory text, which is the test the Supreme Court
would utilize in considering the issue.215 Without a reasonable
203. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75 (1984) (calling for use of the plain meaning rule unless the
statutory language is ambiguous).
204. Id
205. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 347 (Parker, J., dissenting); Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928).
206. Boston Sand and Gravel Co., 278 U.S. at 48.
207. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 347 (Parker, J., dissenting).
208. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 35.
209. See generally, Hayden, 449 F.3d 305.
210. Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.
211. Simmons, 575 F.3d at 35-36.
212. Id. at 33-35.
213. See Simmons, 575 F.3d 24; Hayden, 449 F.3d 305; Johnson, 405 F.3d 1214.




argument as to the statute's ambiguity, the plain meaning of the
statutory text is clear, and each court has overstepped the threshold
concept of Section Two.
3. The Plain Meaning of the Voting Rights Act Has Only One
Reasonable Interpretation
Disregarding the flawed analyses of the United States Courts of
Appeal, Section Two of the Voting Rights Act is broad, but clear.
The statement "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied[,]" very
clearly implicates all voting qualifications or prerequisites.
Congress's use of the terms "no voting qualification" 216 necessarily
implies that, without exception, all voting qualifications are to be
considered under Section Two, including those based on race, but
also those based on any other qualifier, including moral character
(which is the fundamental aspect of felon disenfranchisement) or no
qualifier at all. The statute does not permit the court to question
whether some qualifications should be exempt from the statutory
analysis. Thus, any and all voting qualifications must be analyzed
under the race-based protections of Section Two.
The statutory terms: "in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color," are equally clear.217 This latter portion of
the statutory provision provides the standard by which all voting
qualifications are compared. If the voting qualification denies or
abridges one's right to vote on account of race or color - i.e., if the
statute disparately affects a minority group - the qualification is
unlawful.218 On the other hand, if the qualification does not impose
at least a modicum of racial discrimination, the voting qualification
is valid under Section Two. Despite the flawed decisions of the
First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, a review of the plain meaning
of the statutory text of Section Two leads to one conclusion: Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act is clear and unambiguous. Thus,
under Supreme Court precedent, it is the plain meaning of the statute
which controls the analysis, 219 and the plain meaning of the statute
implies that Section Two of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon
disenfranchisement. It is therefore not permissible to consider
extrinsic information about the statute absent an "extraordinary
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75 (1984) (calling for use of the plain meaning rule unless the
statutory language is ambiguous).
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showing" by Congress that Section Two does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement. 220 This is not to say that a constitutional conflict
is not such an extraordinary basis, rather that Section Two can be
read to specifically address situations in which felon
disenfranchisement has become unconstitutional, not that it makes it
so automatically.
4. The Legislative History of the Voting Rights Act Amendments
Does Not Provide an Extraordinary Showing That Felon
Disenfranchisement Was Excluded from the Reach of the Statute
It has long been believed that Congress says what it intends to
say; thus, if Congress expressly intended for felon disen-
franchisement to be excepted from Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act, it would have so stated.221 Nevertheless, some indication of
legislative intent can be gleaned from the legislative history of the
enactment of the statute.222 In Hayden v. Pataki, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined the legislative
history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act in depth,
and determined that Congress did not intend felon disenfranchise-
ment to fall under Section Two.22 3 However, because the Hayden
court did not follow Supreme Court precedent and with it, the plain
meaning of the statute, in that it did not consider whether the
legislative history constituted an "extraordinary showing" by
Congress that Section Two was inapplicable to felon disenfranchise-
ment.224
In Hayden, the court began its legislative history analysis by
noting that, at the time of the statute's enactment, the Voting Rights
Act was intended to have the "broadest possible scope." 225 The law
was designed to prevent development of new voting practices,
predominantly in the pre-Reconstruction South, to exclude black
220. Id
221. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia states that "Congress expresses statutory meaning
solely through enacted language." Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as
Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 587 (1994).
222. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Intent in Statutory Construction, II HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59, 62 (1988) (stating that when a court uses the legislative history to determine the
intent of the legislators, it "greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the
court"). "Congress is like Humpty Dumpty.... When Congress uses a word, the word means
what Congress says it means," and that meaning is typically found in the legislative history and
committee reports accompanying an enacted law. Spence, supra note 221, at 587 (quoting Abner
J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386 (1987)).
223. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 321-23.
224. See generally id.
225. Id. at 318 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
[Vol. 8:286
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
voters from the election process. 226 Although the statute did not
specifically state that it was inapplicable to felon disenfranchisement,
legislators integral to the drafting of the statute stated during floor
debate that laws barring felon voting would not be challenged under
the statute.227 From this evidence, the court believed that it was
Congress's intent to exclude felon disenfranchisement from the reach
of the statute.228  The court also cited subsequent congressional
activity, including bills from 1972 and 1973 intended to specifically
draw felon disenfranchisement within the boundaries of the statute,
and Congress's 1974 enactment of a felon disenfranchisement statute
for the District of Columbia,229 to support its holding. The court
believed these Congressional activities left "no doubt of the general
understanding that the Voting Rights Act did not encompass felon
disenfranchisement" at the time.230
In turning to the congressional record of the 1982 amendments,
the court noted that Congress made no mention of an intention to
apply the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement, and if it
had intended for that to be the case, Congress would have so stated in
the Senate Report. 231 Because the 1982 amendments were enacted in
direct response to the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Mobile v.
Bolden,232 the court concluded that the only intent of enacting the
amendments was to remedy what Congress saw as an incorrect ruling
from the Supreme Court.233 Based on this cumulative evidence, the
court found Section two of the Voting Rights Act "to be one of the
rare cases in which literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."234
The court's analysis in Hayden comprised three categories:
historical approval of felon disenfranchisement; bills enacted after
the Voting Rights Act that approved of felon disenfranchisement;
and a lack of consideration of the issue in the 1982 amendments. 235
However, none of these categories individually, nor the collective
consideration of all of them, provides an extraordinary showing of
Congress's intent to except felon disenfranchisement from the scope
226. Id. at 317. In 1964, Congress had banned poll taxes by enacting the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 317 n.13. Other practices developed in the months that followed in a
continuing effort by states in the post-Reconstruction South to dilute African-American voting
numbers. Id.
227. Id. at 318-19.
228. Id. at 319.
229. Id. at 319-20.
230. Id. at 320 n. 16.
231. Id. at 320-21.
232. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. 55.
233. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320-21.
234. Id. at 322-23.
235. Id. at 317-23.
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of Section Two.
Although there is a long history of approval for the practice of
disenfranchising felons, 236 it does not lend credence to the court's
position that because felon disenfranchisement was not up for debate
at the time of the amendment of the statute; race was. Testimony and
statements by legislators were limited to implementing a results test
for plaintiffs' claims in order to ensure the right to vote in all
members of racial minorities. 237 The congressional record indicates
that Congress was concerned with ensuring that no voting test or
requirement discriminated based on race.23 8 Had Congress intended
that felon disenfranchisement be the lone exception to its "no voting
requirement" rule, it is likely that some member of Congress would
have mentioned that in the congressional record and floor debates.239
No member of Congress mentioned felon disenfranchisement during
the debate on the amendments, but there is significant comment
about how any voting test that results in racial discrimination would
violate the statute. 240
Second, the court cited to Congress' passage of a felon
disenfranchisement statute for the District of Columbia in the years
following the enactment of the original Voting Rights Act to prove
that Congress could not have intended to place felon
disenfranchisement within the reach of Section Two.2 41 Again, the
court misconstrues the reach of the statute. Section Two does not
invalidate the fundamental lawfulness of felon disenfranchisement.
Instead, Section Two only works to eradicate racial discrimination in
voting requirements. If felon disenfranchisement results in racial
discrimination, then it would be invalid under Section Two, but there
is no indication Congress made any such analysis. 242 It can only be
assumed that, at the time it enacted a felon disenfranchisement
statute in the District of Columbia, Congress did not believe that it
was purposefully drawing a statute that would result in racial
discrimination. Rather, it drew a statute that mimicked the felon
disenfranchisement laws already in existence in a vast majority of the
states.243
Finally, the court argued that if Congress had intended felon
236. Id. at 316-17.
237. S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra note 129, at 1-4.
238. See generally id
239. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 367-68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that if Congress
intended for felon disenfranchisement to be excluded from Section Two of the Voting Rights Act,
it could have stated so in the text or comments of the statute).
240. See generally S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra note 129.
241. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320.
242. See generally S. Rep. No. 97-417 supra note 129.
243. Id.
88 [Vol. 8:2
disenfranchisement to fall within the reach of Section Two, there
would have been statements made to that effect in the congressional
record.244 While, admittedly, the court is correct that no statements
were made to specifically include felon disenfranchisement within
Section Two, it is also correct that no statements were made to
specifically exclude felon disenfranchisement from Section Two.245
Instead, members of Congress were concerned that some other
electoral devices that had been in place for decades, such as at-large
elections, might be ruled unlawful under the 1982 amendments.246
The congressional record indicates, however, that "[e]lectoral
devices, including at-large elections, per se would not be subject to
attack under Section [Two]. They would only be vulnerable, if, in
the totality of the circumstances, they resulted in the denial of equal
access to the process." 247 This statement of Congress is directly
analogous to felon disenfranchisement. Both at-large elections and
felon disenfranchisement were standard practice in states throughout
the country at the time of the amendments.248 Because the language
of Section Two applies to all voting requirements, both would
presumably fall within the reach of Section Two. Members of
Congress were concerned that Section Two would invalidate at-large
elections, but the Senate Report makes it clear that those elections
would only be unlawful where they result in racial discrimination.249
The same principle is applicable to felon disenfranchisement.
Section Two would not invalidate felon disenfranchisement,
inherently, unless the practice of disenfranchising felons results in
vote denial or dilution on account of race.
Although the court in Hayden was convinced that Congress did
not intend for felon disenfranchisement to fall within the purview of
Section Two, its analysis falls short of the "extraordinary showing"
necessary to prove Congress intended something other than the plain
meaning of the statutory text.250 Logically, if Congress intended for
felon disenfranchisement to be excluded from Section Two, it would
have stated so either in the statute itself or in the Congressional
chamber at the time of the enactment of the amendments. 251 Indeed,
as then circuit judge Sotomayor stated in her dissenting opinion in
244. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320-21.
245. See generally S. Rep. No. 97-417 supra note 129.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 17.
248. Id
249. See id. at 1-16.
250. Hayden, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006).
251. See id. at 367-68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that if Congress intended for felon
disenfranchisement to be excluded from Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, it could have
stated so in the text or comments of the statute).
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Hayden,252 the "[majority's] 'wealth of persuasive evidence' that
Congress intended felony disenfranchisement laws to be immune
from scrutiny under [Section Two] . .. includes not a single
legislator actually saying so."253
In determining what constitutes an "extraordinary showing" of
contrary intent, the Supreme Court has stated that "Committee
Reports are 'more authoritative"'254 and in many cases, is the only
thing courts should consider.255 The Senate Reports here are clear:
The Congressional focus in drafting the 1982 amendments was to
eradicate racial discrimination resulting from any voting
requirement. Because felon disenfranchisement is a voting
requirement, by its own words, Congress intended felon
disenfranchisement to fall within the reach of Section Two. Thus,
there can be made no extraordinary showing that Congress intended
to exclude felon disenfranchisement from consideration, and the
plain meaning of the statute - that it applies to all voting
qualifications and requirements - dictates that Section two applies
to felon disenfranchisement.
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Results in Denying Individuals
the Right to Vote on Account of Race
Once it is determined that Section Two of the Voting Rights Act
applies to felon disenfranchisement provisions, the analysis of
whether felon disenfranchisement practices are unlawful turns on
whether that practice has the result of denying an individual's right
to vote on account of race.256 It has been decades since the Supreme
252. Justice Sotomayor's opinion was not long - a mere three short paragraphs, in fact - but,
according to Justice Sotomayor, that is all the analysis that was required. Hayden, 449 F.3d at
367. In dissenting from the majority decision which held that the Voting Rights Act does not
apply to felon disenfranchisement, Id. at 328, Justice Sotomayor filed a "separate opinion only to
emphasize one point," Id. at 367. She feared "that the many pages of the majority opinion and
concurrences - and the many pages of the dissent that are necessary to explain why they are
wrong - may give the impression that this case is in some way complex. It is not." Id. Justice
Sotomayor's analysis was decisively and unambiguously conclusive: the Voting Rights Act
"applies to all 'voting qualifications[,]' and undoubtedly, felon disenfranchisement laws place a
voting qualification on a group of people. Id. at 367-68. Accordingly, the Voting Rights Act
applies to felon disenfranchisement. Id. at 368. Justice Sotomayor went on to argue that "[tihe
duty of a judge is to follow the law[.] ... Congress [does not] wish [ ] [the Court] to disregard
the plain language of any statute or to invent exceptions to the statutes it has created." Id.
253. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 368 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
254. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 76 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968)).
255. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982). The concept of vote denial is not a new one in
American law, see, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), however, the Supreme Court has
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Court has considered a vote denial claim such as the ones alleged by
plaintiffs in felon disenfranchisement cases, and currently, no
standard test or analysis exists that would guide courts in their
consideration of vote denial claims. However, the Court, in
Thornburg v. Gingles, considered, and developed a test against
which courts may analyze, vote dilution claims. 257 Based on the
inherent similarities between vote denial and vote dilution claims,
this article argues that a modified vote dilution test should be
imposed in vote denial cases. 258  This modified test would
incorporate an analysis of the three principle concepts of vote denial
and dilution: power, cohesion and submergence, and the fundamental
right of citizens to vote. For felon disenfranchisement, the test
requires an analysis of the Senate Factors drafted alongside the 1982
Voting Rights Act amendments.259 These same Senate Factors were
never drafted a test by which courts could analyze such claims. Instead, during the 1950s and
1960s, the Court utilized what can best be described as an "eyeball test" to consider cases
challenging statutes that imposed literacy tests and other voting requirements allegedly aimed at
disenfranchising African Americans. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959), for instance, the Court found that a literacy test appeared to be North Carolina's
effort to "raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot," rather than a method by
which the state could disenfranchise blacks. Id. at 54. Rather than determine whether the literacy
tests impacted any single race, the court merely "eyeballed" whether the statute was clearly
racially discriminatory. See generally, id. A similar test was imposed in Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), where the Supreme Court ruled a more complex literacy test
unconstitutional. Id. at 155. In that case, the Court cited ample evidence that qualified black
voters had been excluded from the voting process because the State imposed a broad rule that
allowed election officials to determine, without guidance, which individuals may vote. Id. at
150-51. The Court's "eyeball test" determined that the law logically appeared to be a purposeful
deterrent from voting for blacks who were the subject of discrimination by poll workers. Id. at
150.
As purposeful discrimination became less obvious, the "eyeball test" of the 1950s and 1960s
gave way to a more modem two-pronged test used from the late 1970s through the mid-I 980s.
Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 26 (2006); see also Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 12, at 719.
Legislators became far savvier in developing laws, such as identification requirements and ballot
technology measures, to disenfranchise blacks. The New Vote Denial, supra note 12, at 719.
Although such restrictions appear raceneutral, and would thus pass an "eyeball test," they
adversely and impermissibly impact African-American or minority communities. Id. Under the
two-prong test, courts determined: first, whether the "events" or "episodes" complained of were
significant such that they rose "to the level of 'voting practices or procedures[;]' and, second,
"whether the voting practices operated to deny [minorities] an equal opportunity to participate
and elect candidates of their choice." Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64 (W.D. La. 1968).
Indeed, the two-prong test for vote dilution claims mimicked the results test later drafted as an
amendment to the Voting Rights Act to include vote denial claims. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. §
1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982).
257. Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51. Vote dilution is the practice of imposing various voting
restrictions on the citizens of a certain area that adversely impacts the strength of an otherwise
politically powerful minority group. See also Tokaji, supra note 12, at 719.
258. See infra Part III.B.2.
259. See infra Part III.B.3.
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contemplated in Farrakhan II, which ruled that felon
disenfranchisement violated Section Two.260 With the Senate Factors
in mind, a thorough analysis of felon disenfranchisement under this
proposed test shows that the practice denies citizens of the right to
vote on account of race and is therefore unlawful under the Voting
Rights Act.261
1. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Voting Rights Act
Results Test Offers Guidance as to How to Analyze Vote
Denial Claims Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court considered the
results test of the Voting Rights Act for the first time.2 62 In Gingles,
the Court considered an act of the North Carolina General Assembly
redistricting the state's legislative election districts. 2 63  African-
American citizens challenged the redistricting plan under Section
Two, arguing that the revision of legislative districts split
communities with large populations of African-American voters into
separate, neighboring districts with large populations of Caucasian
voters, thereby "submerging [blacks] in a white majority." 264
In its analysis of the Voting Rights Act claim, the Court stated
that vote dilution claims - which often concern legislative
districting - should be considered under a three-part test.2 65 First,
the court will ask whether the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact such that the minority group constitutes a
majority in at least one district.266 Second, the court will consider
whether that minority group is politically cohesive (i.e., that
members of that minority group generally vote for the same
candidates). 267 Finally, the court will determine whether the majority
group is sufficiently politically cohesive as to enable it to usually
defeat the minority group's preferred candidate.268 The test considers
the minority group's power and cohesion, and whether the interests
of the minority group are being submerged by a more powerful
group.269 "Satisfaction of the three Gingles factors serves as strong
evidence that a jurisdiction employs a test or device that is
260. Farrakhan II at 1016.
261. See infra Part III.B.4.
262. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 34.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 46.







discriminatory in purpose or effect. . ."270
Under the Gingles test, the first prong is generally an objective
consideration, where sheer population numbers may be sufficient
proof.27 1 It may be enough for a plaintiff to prove that minority
voters' residences are generally segregated into homogenous
communities rather than integrated relatively evenly amongst the
majority voters' residences. 272 For the second and third prongs, the
Court believed they could be satisfied under various factual
circumstances, but that there did exist some general principles which
pervade all inquiries. 273  Such factors include the presence of
minority bloc voting and the consistency with which such bloc
voting occurs.274 Logically, "a pattern of racial bloc voting that
extends over a period of time is more probative of a claim that a
district experiences legally significant polarization than are results of
a single election."275
Districting is often used by the political party in power to reduce
the likelihood of that party losing legislative seats in an election.
While the concepts found in the Gingles test are specific to vote
dilution claims because they involve districting, they translate well to
vote denial, particularly regarding felon disenfranchisement. Both
vote denial, as is applies to felon disenfranchisement, and vote
dilution, involve a politically powerful group eliminating the vote
effectiveness of a less powerful group. In essence, they both
"implicate the value of participation."276 Felon disenfranchisement
dilutes the population of racial minorities from voting pools because
much higher percentages of racial minorities are barred from voting
through felon disenfranchisement. Although scholars have argued
that vote denial and vote dilution are fundamentally different
concepts, 27 their eventual result is the same: A minority group's
voting interests are submerged to a majority group's through voting
requirements.
One major area in which vote denial and vote dilution differ is
that the right to vote is a fundamental one.278 Courts have long
considered the right to vote to be one of the foundations of our
270. Kristen Clarke, The Obama Factor: The Impact of the 2008 Presidential Election on
Future Voting Rights Act Litigation, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 59, 63 (2009).
271. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 55-56.
274. Id. at 56-58.
275. Id. at 57.
276. Tokaji, supra note 12, at 719.
277. See, e.g., id; See also Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New
Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 373 (2006); Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act
and Vote Dilution, 19 GA. L. REV. 459, 461 (1985).
278. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
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process of governance. 279 In that respect, vote denial infringes upon
one of the most important rights of citizens of this country. As
scholars have noted, constitutional analyses on provisions that deny
certain individuals the right to vote based on race require strict
scrutiny from the Supreme Court.280 Because vote dilution does not
run afoul of a fundamental right, at least in the general sense, the
strict treatment implies that an even more compelling justification for
denying the right to vote to certain citizens be proven by the state. A
modification of the Gingles test to incorporate portions of the strict
scrutiny standard would provide that justification.
2. A Modification of the Gingles Test Provides an Appropriate
Guideline for Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement
Although the Gingles281 test does not specifically address vote
denial claims, the inherent similarities between vote denial and vote
delusion are clear. At the heart of the Supreme Court's analysis
regarding vote dilution are the concepts of power, cohesion and
submergence; these concepts exist equally in vote denial
circumstances. The test proposed by this article, termed the
Modified Gingles Test, includes each of those concepts: First, the
excluded portion of a minority group represents a politically
significant portion of the minority group to which it belongs; second,
the excluded minority group is politically cohesive such that
members of that minority group tend to vote for the same candidates
or referenda; and third, removal of the voting restriction is
reasonably likely to have an effect on the outcome of a local or
national election. If a plaintiff is able to prove each of the three
major concepts, the modified test incorporates a burden-shifting
fourth prong: the state must prove that the subject-voting
requirement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.282
279. Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1708 (1993).
280. Lashanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental
Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 318, 347 n.158 (2010). Notably, strict scrutiny is applied both
to laws that affect fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, and to laws that burden members
of a suspect classification, such as race. Id.
281. Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30.
282. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Farrakhan III,
enumerated a minimal standard under which felon disenfranchisement may be challenged on the
ground that there exists racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, see Farrakhan III,
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a. The Excluded Portion of the Minority Group Represents
a Politically Significant Portion of the Local or
National Electorate
Under the first prong of the Modified Gingles Test, the excluded
individuals must represent a politically significant portion of their
minority group on a local or national level. This prong is similar to
the first prong of the Gingles test, as it relates to the political power
of the minority group.283 To determine whether a population of
people constitutes a politically significant portion of a minority
group, a court must look to the local population including and
excluding the minority group. If the difference in the numbers of
eligible voters of the minority group, after the voting requirement is
imposed, prevents that minority group from playing a significant role
in the electoral process, the excluded voters represent a politically
significant portion of the electorate.
b. The Excluded Minority Group is Politically Cohesive
Such that Members of that Minority Group Tend to Vote
for the Same Candidates or Referenda
The second prong of the Modified Gingles Test would require
that the excluded minority group is politically cohesive such that
members of that minority group tend to vote for the same candidates
or referenda. This prong is identical to the second prong of the
Gingles test. 284  It requires the court to determine whether a
significant portion of the minority group members tend to vote for
the same candidates or ballot measures. This may be demonstrated
by objective criteria such as individual statistical evidence in
national, state and local elections or a history of previous and
consistent racial bloc voting. In addition, this prong can be proven
through circumstantial evidence, such as exit polls and witness
testimony. This circumstantial evidence should be offered as support
to further expound upon statistical evidence. To the extent a plaintiff
only offers circumstantial evidence, such evidence would be highly
suspect.
c. Removal of the Voting Restriction Is Reasonably Likely
623 F.3d 990 at 992-93, the test was created based on Fourteenth Amendment principles, rather
than the Supreme Court's prior Voting Rights Act analyses. Accordingly, this article abandons
the Ninth Circuit analysis in favor of the one described herein.
283. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
284. Id.
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to Have an Effect on the Outcome of a Local or
National Election
The third prong of the Modified Gingles Test asks whether
removal of the voting restriction being challenged is reasonably
likely to have an effect on the outcome of a local or national election.
This prong tracks the third prong of the Gingles test to the extent it
considers whether the voter restriction renders the minority group
subject to the decisions of a more powerful majority.285 If the
difference in the voting population of the minority group is
consistently likely to change the outcome of local or national
elections, then the third prong of this test has been satisfied. In
analyzing this prong, courts should consider the political
environment of the challenged area. This prong is not designed to be
satisfied if a single election may be affected by the voting
requirement (such as the occasional election decided by a handful of
votes). Rather, it is satisfied only where the recent election history of
a given area shows that the minority group would make a difference
in multiple elections. It would not be necessary, under this prong, to
prove that the outcome of any given election would change; rather
the minority group would have a significant effect on the process.
d. The Subject Voting Requirement Is Narrowly Tailored
to Serve a Compelling State Interest
If an individual or group of plaintiffs prove the first three prongs
of the Modified Gingles Test, the burden shifts to the State to prove
that its interest in imposing the challenged voting requirement is a
compelling one and that the voting requirement is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. This prong tracks the well-settled
constitutional strict scrutiny standard of review courts apply to laws
that infringe upon the right to vote.286 While courts have never
created a bright line rule to determine whether a state interest is
compelling, these interests are generally described as vital, crucial
and necessary state objectives. 287 To prove that a voting requirement
is narrowly tailored, the State must impose the least restrictive means
necessary to serve that interest. This prong would effectively
challenge the Supreme Court's holding in Richardson v. Ramirez,
supra, which held that a state need not prove a compelling interest in
285. Id.
286. See Sarah Stenberg-Miller, Comment, Elections - Nominations, and Primary Elections:
The Supreme Court Finds that California's "Blanket Primary" Violates Political Parties' First
Amendment Right ofAssociation, 77 N.D. L. REv. 827, 831 n.41 (2001).
287. Id.
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order to deny those convicted of crimes the right to vote based on
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly permits
felon disenfranchisement. 288 This prong, however, ensures that when
the State attempts to infringe upon the right of its citizens to vote, the
voting qualification must receive the most exacting analysis.289
3. Under This Modified Gingles Test, Courts Must Consider
the Senate Factors Drafted Alongside the 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
To determine whether a voting restriction prevents a minority
group from participating equally in the voting process, courts must
consider the impact of the voting restriction on minority electoral
opportunities through objective criteria. 290 When the Senate enacted
the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, it also drafted a set
of such objective factors to accompany them. 291 These Senate
Factors have been used by various courts to consider voter
challenges under the Voting Rights Act.2 92 The Supreme Court's
acceptance of the Senate Report Factors in myriad caseS293 implies
that it would likewise utilize these Factors in other Voting Rights Act
analyses addressing the results test.
Of the nine Senate Factors discussed by Congress in connection
with the Voting Rights Act Amendments, six are of particular
relevance to vote denial claims. The relevant Senate Factors to be
considered by courts in these analyses include: the history of racial
discrimination in the electoral process in the area; the racial
polarization of current elections; the effect of discrimination of the
minority group's access and experience in education, health,
employment, and other areas of everyday life; the existence of race-
based political campaign practices; the ability of racial minorities to
achieve political office; and a lack of response to the needs of the
minority community. 294 Of these, the Supreme Court has stated that
288. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24, 53.
289. The strict scrutiny standard is used on Equal Protection and Due Process challenges to
fundamental rights or for laws that burden members of a suspect classification. While it is logical
to assume that any challenge to voting qualifications will include a constitutional argument under
the Equal Protection Clause and/or the Due Process Clause, the inclusion in the modified Gingles
test reiterates the importance of the right to vote and ensures that courts treat voting requirements
with the appropriate level of scrutiny.
290. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44.
291. S. Rep. 97-417 at 28-29 (1982).
292. League of United Latin Amer. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 426 (2006); Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 954 n.6 (1994); Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 69; see also Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at
1018; Benavidez v. City of Irving, Texas, 638 F. Supp. 2d 709, 732 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
293. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 36-37.
294. S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra note 129, at 28-29.
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the most important factors relevant to vote dilution or vote denial
challenges are the ability of minority candidates to reach political
office and the racial polarization of voting practices in the area.295
The other factors are considered "supportive of," but not essential to,
a vote denial claim. 2 96 A reviewing court is not bound by the Factors
and may include additional factors not contemplated by Congress or
modify the Factors as appropriate.297 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did just that when it analyzed Senate
Factor five in Farrakhan I.298
In Farrakhan II, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' compelling
evidence of racial disparity in the criminal justice system should be
considered under Senate Factor five, and that it was sufficient to
prove, in that case, that felon disenfranchisement violates Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act.299 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs had offered "compelling, direct" statistical evidence of
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, which the court
found sufficient to tip the totality of the circumstances analysis in
plaintiffs' favor, proving that felon disenfranchisement has the result
of denying citizens the right to vote on account of race.300 Although
the plaintiffs were unable to show any other Senate Factors were
implicated by their evidence, the court recognized that the plaintiffs'
evidence of Senate Factor five was so compelling as to be sufficient
to prove their case.301 The Ninth Circuit's use of Senate Factor five
is also instructive for an analysis under the Modified Gingles Test
described herein.
4. With the Senate Factors in Mind, Under the Modified
Gingles Test, Felon Disenfranchisement Has the Result of
Denying the Right to Vote on Account ofRace
The final question in an analysis of whether felon
disenfranchisement practices violate Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act must turn on whether it can be proven with sufficient
certainty that felon disenfranchisement denies citizens of this
country the right to vote "on account of race . . ."302 Previously, the
Court has been reluctant to find widespread racial bias in the
criminal justice system, because the impact of such a ruling would
295. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.
296. Id.
297. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1004; see also S. Rep. No. 97-417, supra note 129, at 29.
298. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 1005 n.20.
299. Id. at 1016.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1004.
302. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965 & Supp. 1982).
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have a colossal impact on other parts of the criminal justice
system.303 "The roadblocks to reform of racially biased and other
unfair and unconstitutional practices and policies in the criminal
justice system that have emerged . .. are daunting. The Supreme
Court has placed significant obstacles to the pursuit of racial justice
and equality in the criminal justice system."04 Moreover, appellate
courts have generally avoided discussing racial bias in the justice
system.305 Instead, the courts rely on the landmark decisions of
other courts306 - although few and far between - and the
congressional efforts of various legislatures to reduce racial
disparity in the criminal justice system. In addition, the Court is
often unwilling to accept statistical evidence as proof that racial
discrimination actually exists in the criminal justice system. 3 07
Often, proof of racial discrimination is only available through
statistics, thus it is a difficult task for plaintiffs to garner the relief
they seek. Under the Modified Gingles Test proposed in this
article, a more uniform analysis of racial discrimination in voting
practices could result.
Under the Modified Gingles Test, plaintiffs in challenges to
facially race neutral voting restrictions must prove that: (a) the
excluded minority group represents a politically significant portion
of that minority group; (b) the excluded minority group is politically
cohesive such that members of that minority group tend to vote for
the same candidates or referenda; (c) removal of the voting
restriction is reasonably likely to have an effect on the outcome of
local or national elections.308 If all three prongs of the test are met,
the burden shifts to the State to prove that the challenged voting
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
In order to succeed on a challenge to a state felon
disenfranchisement provision, a group of plaintiffs must first prove
that they are members of a minority group and that they represent a
politically significant portion of that minority group. According to
the Sentencing Project, a research and advocacy group seeking repeal
of felon disenfranchisement laws throughout the country, "[m]ore
than [sixty percent] of the people in prison are now racial
303. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-15.
304. David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal
Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 97 (2007).
305. William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of Racial Bias in the
Minnesota Justice System, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 235, 239 (2002).
306. Cases such as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that race could not be a
factor in removing potential jurors from jury pools), are indicative.
307. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-95.
308. See supra Part 1lI.B.2.
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minorities."309 This statistic has a profound effect on voting rights
due to felon disenfranchisement provisions. While only
approximately two percent of the United States' total population is
disenfranchised due to felony conviction, a significant portion of the
African-American population - more than eight percent, or about
two million blacks - is disenfranchised. 10 No state disenfranchises
a higher percentage of whites than blacks.311 For instance, in
Mississippi, 13.2% of the African-American population is
disenfranchised; in Alabama, the percentage is 15.3.312
Throughout this country, one thing is consistent when it comes
to felon disenfranchisement - a significant portion of the African-
American population is being disenfranchised. In all but two states
that disenfranchise felons, at least two percent of the African-
American population is disenfranchised.3 13 At least five percent are
disenfranchised in thirty-one states, and sixteen states disenfranchise
at least ten percent of blacks.314 Because most African Americans
vote cohesively, the large numbers of African Americans
disenfranchised from voting is politically significant.
The second prong of the Modified Gingles Test requires
plaintiffs challenging voting requirements to prove the political
cohesion of the minority community.315  In recent presidential
elections, African Americans have voted overwhelmingly for
Democratic candidates.316
The final prong which plaintiffs must prove in vote denial
challenges to felon disenfranchisement under the Modified Gingles
Test is that removal of the subject vote requirement is reasonably
likely to have an effect on local or national elections.317 Blacks are
disenfranchised at eight times the rate of whites, and as of 2005, over
309. Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template
/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
310. Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/
map.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
311. Id. (click on each state to see individual state data)
312. Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/
statedata/cfm?abbrev=MS&mapdata-true (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). In Mississippi and
Alabama, respectively, approximately four percent of each state's total population is comprised
on disenfranchised African Americans. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See supra Part lll.B.2.b.
316. David A. Bositis, The Black Vote in 2004, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICALAND ECON.
STUDIES, 8 (2005). Al Gore received over ninety percent of the African-American vote in the
2000 presidential election. Id. John Kerry received approximately eighty-eight percent of the
black vote four years later. Id. Barack Obama received over ninety-six percent of the black vote
in the 2008 presidential election. David Paul Kuhn, Exit Polls: How Obama Won, POLITCO
(Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/108/15297.html.
317. See supra Part Ill.B.2.c.
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twenty percent of the black population in at least seven states was
disenfranchised. 318 With as many as two million African-American
men nationally disenfranchised from the right to vote due to
commission of a felony, 319 and a vast majority of African Americans
voting cohesively for Democratic candidates and socially
conservative referenda, 320 the number of votes that would be cast
absent felon disenfranchisement provisions is staggering.
"Because African Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic
Party voters, felon disenfranchisement erodes the Democratic voting
base by reducing the number of eligible African American voters."321
Considering that white felons typically are working class individuals
who also vote Democratic, the effect of felon disenfranchisement is
even more significant. 322 It is hypothesized by some social scientists
that as much as seventy percent of disenfranchised felons would vote
for Democratic candidates if they were allowed to vote. 32 3 In a two-
party system of election, like the one that exists in the United States,
where the winner of an election needs to garner a simple majority of
the votes cast in a single election, a small number of votes can have a
profound impact on the outcome. 324 Given this information, it is
clear that the impact of felon disenfranchisement on elections is
significant, and the disenfranchisement of African Americans has an
effect on the election process.
318. Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/
map.cfin. In Iowa, over one-third of the black population was disenfranchised, whereas less than
five percent of the white population was. Id.
319. Id.
320. See supra Part III.B.4.
321. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2001).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 15.
324. Id. at 8. In a statistical survey of past presidential, gubernatorial and senatorial elections,
which analyzed voter turnout and voter preference, felon disenfranchisement likely affected the
outcome of at least one presidential election. Id. at 23-25. John F. Kennedy's victory in 1960,
Jimmy Carter's victory in 1976 and George W. Bush's victory in 2000 likely all would have been
greatly impacted had felons been afforded the right to vote in those elections. Id. at 24-27.
Because they were Democratic candidates, Kennedy and Carter would likely have won by far
wider margins, whereas Bush, the Republican candidate, likely would have lost his elections. Id.
at 24-27. Four gubernatorial elections would likely have been impacted. Id. at 27-28. In all four
cases, Republicans won elections for governor, but had felons been permitted to vote, all four
elections would likely have swung into the Democratic column. Id. Finally, four senatorial
elections would likely have different results. Id. at 17-20. Again, Republican victories would
have been reversed in favor of Democratic candidates in all four Senate races. The resounding
effect of these victories would mean that Democrats controlled the Senate throughout the 1990s,
rather than the Republicans. Id. at 18-19. These statistics showed that, in its present condition,
"felon disenfranchisement, combined with rapid growth in the size of the disenfranchised
population," often alters elections, particularly on state and local levels, where elections can be
decided by mere handfuls of votes. Id. at 28.
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Once a group of plaintiffs have proven the three prongs of the
Modified Gingles Test, the burden would shift to the state to prove
that felon disenfranchisement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest and that it imposes only the least
restrictive means necessary to achieve a vital, necessary government
objective.325 Historically, in voting rights cases, the government has
offered as a compelling interest the need for the government to
regulate the voting and electoral process. 326  Admittedly, this
argument will likely pass muster as a compelling governmental
interest upon review by courts, given the historical approval of such
an argument. Courts have consistently approved any reasonable
interest announced by the State related to voting rights as
compelling. 327
On the other hand, it would be very difficult for the state to
prove that felon disenfranchisement is narrowly tailored to serve the
state's regulation of the political process.328 The narrow tailoring
requirement insists that the state prove that no less restrictive method
for achieving the interest exists.329 Indeed, in considering felon
disenfranchisement and the narrow tailoring requirement, Justice
Thurgood Marshall, in Richardson v. Ramirez, stated that felon
disenfranchisement was not narrowly tailored to achieve any
government interest, no matter how compelling. 330
One of the reasons it would be difficult for a court to determine
that felon disenfranchisement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest is because the practice of
disenfranchising felons is accomplished through several different
methods. Some states disenfranchise felons for life, which almost
assuredly could not be narrowly tailored, as the regulation of the
electoral system would likely not suffer by felons who have
completed their sentence, parole and probation requirements voting.
325. See supra Part IllI.B.2.d.
326. See William R. Kirscher, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political
Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 683, 690-91 (1995) (discussing how courts have found compelling
state interests in promoting the stability of the political system; promoting an educated electorate;
maintaining the integrity of the election process; and regulating the manner in which
representatives are elected). The Court has also considered protecting against voter fraud to be a
compelling interest. See e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. 24.
327. Id
328. See Matthew D. Bunker, Standing at the Crossroads: Social Science, Human Agency and
Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 23 (2004) (arguing that the narrow tailoring prong of
constitutional scrutiny tests is difficult to meet).
329. Id.
330. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24, 79-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand, "Marshall
found that ex-felons do have an interest in the democratic process, and they cannot be excluded
based on the substance of the votes they would (presumably) cast." Jason Schall, 22 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 61 n.88 (2006).
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Evidence of this fact is that other states successfully impose less-
restrictive means to achieve the state interests, such as
disenfranchising felons only during the terms of their incarceration
or disenfranchising felons only prior to the completion of their parole
and probation periods.331 In addition, narrow tailoring is difficult to
prove with felon disenfranchisement because thousands of
individuals vote every election by absentee ballot. Incarcerated
individuals would not need to leave their prison cells to file their
ballots, and the practice of voting by absentee ballot, given its
popularity in today's society, does not appear to compromise the
electoral system in any significant way. Both of these practices
present less-restrictive alternatives to an outright ban on felon voting,
and absentee balloting presents a less-restrictive alternative to felon
disenfranchisement in general. Accordingly, the state would not
likely be able to prove that felon disenfranchisement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and felon
disenfranchisement provisions would fail the Modified Gingles Test.
Conclusion
Although the right to vote has always been one of the most
fundamental rights known to citizens of this nation,332 since the
creation of this country, felons have been barred from the elective
franchise.333 These disenfranchisement practices adversely impact
racial minorities, and significant percentages of African-American,
Latino and Native-American voters are unable to participate in the
election process.334 In the early twenty-first century, as the public
learned about the impact of felon disenfranchisement on the electoral
process, public support for re-enfranchisement began to rise,33s but
the court system, which has been given the opportunity to eliminate
felon disenfranchisement through judicial decree, has thus far been
reluctant to take the next step towards voter equality for all. The
Supreme Court has rejected constitutional equal protection
challenges to felon disenfranchisement, armed with the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically permits denying
voting rights to felons.
Adverse Supreme Court rulings have left only one remaining
argument by which felons may reasonably seek vote equality. Under
331. See supra notes 10- 11 and accompanying text.
332. Gardner, supra note 4, at 437 (citing Common Clause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340,
1345 (11th Cir. 2009)).
333. Brisman, supra note 31, at 331 (citing Ewald, supra note 9, at 1059-66).
334. Id.
335. Manza, supra note 46, at 283.
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the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982, disenfranchised felons
have attempted to argue that felon disenfranchisement results in the
denial of their right to vote on account of race. Courts have been
reluctant to take this position, and the Supreme Court has largely
avoided the issue to date. However, a favorable decision from the
Ninth Circuit has breathed new life to the movement to end felon
disenfranchisement. The time has come for the Supreme Court to
determine whether felons are entitled to the same fundamental rights
afforded other citizens of this country. The time has come to save
felons from suffering without suffrage.
